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of the elements of capital murder cannot be used as the sole basis for a
death sentence. The jury must, in addition, find the aggravating factors
of either "vileness" or "future dangerousness."5 1 The trial court (and the
Supreme Court of Virginia) evidently understood Breard's proposed
instruction to mean that Breard wanted to keep the jury from considering
anything which may have contributed to the jury's finding the defendant
guilty during the guilt phase.
B. Defendant's Possibility of Parole Instruction
At trial, defense counsel expressly agreed, apparently for strategic
reasons, to the judge's refusal to answer the jury's question concerning
Breard's parole eligibility.52 The record does not reflect whether Breard
would have been statutorily eligible for parole if sentenced to life in
51 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264A(C) (1990).
52 Breard, 248 Va. at 87, 445 S.E.2d at 681.
53 See Va. Code Ann. § 53.1-151(4)(C) (Supp. 1994) ("Any person
sentenced to life imprisonment for the first time shall be eligible for
parole after serving fifteen years, except that if such sentence was for a
Class 1 felony violation ... he shall be eligible for parole after serving
twenty-five years, unless he is ineligible for parole pursuant to subsec-
tion BI or B2."); and Va. Code Ann. § 53.1-15 1(4)(D) (Supp. 1994) ("A
person who has been sentenced to two or more life sentences, except a
person to whom the provisions of subsection B 1, B2 or E of this section
are applicable, shall be eligible for parole after serving twenty years of
imprisonment, except that if either such sentence, or both, was or were
for a Class 1 felony violation, and he is not otherwise ineligible forparole
pursuant to subsection B1, B2 or E of this section, he shall be eligible for
parole only after serving thirty years.").
prison. If life in prison for Breard meant life without parole, there is no
justification for such a decision. If a life sentence would technically
mean parole eligibility in twenty-five or thirty years,5 3 however, an
attorney might conclude in the rare case that parole law information
would not be helpful.
The United States Supreme Court recently decided in Simmons v.
South Carolina54 that defense counsel can insist that the jury be informed
when life means life without parole.55 The Court also left open the
possibility that parole information must be given to the jury on request
in any case where future dangerousness is one of the aggravating factors
upon which the Commonwealthrelies in seeking a death sentence.56 The
implication of Simmons in Virginia should be followed closely.
57
Summary and analysis by:
Gregory J. Weinig
54 114 S. Ct. 2187 (1994).
55 See case summary of Simmons, Capital Defense Digest, this
issue.
56 See Pohl & Turner, If atFirst YouDon'tSucceed: The Real and
Potential Impact of Simmons v. South Carolina in Virginia, Capital
Defense Digest, this issue.
57 Id. At this writing the United States Supreme Court had denied
Breard's petition for certiorari. Breard v. Virginia, 1994 WL 512727
(U.S. 1994). In comparison, the petition of Walter Mickens, Mickens v.
Commonwealth, 247 Va. 395,442 S.E.2d 678 (1994), was granted and
the case remanded to the Supreme Court of Virginia on the Simmons
issue. See Mickens v. Virginia, 115 S. Ct. 307 (1994), and case summary
of Mickens, Capital Defense Digest, this issue.
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FACTS
On March 30, 1992, at approximately 12:30 p.m., a body identified
as Timothy Jason Hall was found beneath an abandoned construction
building in Newport News, Virginia. The body, lying face down on a
mattress, was nude from the waist down except for white athletic socks.
Bloody "transfer" stains and a white liquid substance were evident at the
scene. At a nearby river the police found the victim's blue jeans and
underwear which had washed up in the surf of the river. The medical
examiner concluded that the victim had bled to death from twenty-five
of 143 stab wounds.1
On April 4, 1992, Walter Mickens, Jr. was arrested by police on
charges involving Timothy Hall. The following morning warrants were
obtained charging Mickens with Hall's murder and attempted sodomy.
An examination of a stain found on the mattress cover revealed human
sperm. The Commonwealth's DNA analysis taken from the stain also
revealed a pattern similar to Mickens' DNA. Furthermore, Tyrone




Brister testified that when he and Mickens shared a holding cell at the
courthouse on March 26, 1993, Mickens told him he had stabbed
somebody 140 times, sodomized him and stole his sneakers.
2
In the first stage of abifurcated trial, the jury convicted Mickens of
capital murder and attempted forcible sodomy. In the second stage of the
trial, the jury fixed his punishment at death.
3
HOLDING
Consolidating the automatic review of Mickens's death sentence
with his appeal of the capital murder conviction, the Supreme Court ol
Virginia upheld the death sentence based on the "vileness" and "future
dangerousness" predicates. 4
4 The court rejected some of the defendant's assignments of error
in brief, conclusive language. Others did not involve death penalty law.
On still others, the rulings provide little if any guidance because they
apply broad, settled principles of law to facts that are specific to the case
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ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
I. Default: Relief From Fifty Page Brief Limitation
On appeal, Mickens argued that the trial court erred in refusing to
grant a pretrial motion to prohibit the imposition of the death penalty.
5
In doing so, he relied on his appellate brief and his trial memorandum.
6
The reliance on the trial memorandum was most likely an effort by
Mickens to avoid the fifty page brief limitation imposed on those seeking
review from the Supreme Court of Virginia.7 The Supreme Court of
Virginia, however, refused to consider these arguments. 8 The court
stated that an assertion of a trial court error must be stated clearly to the
appellate court and not through a cross-reference to arguments made at
trial.9 As a result, several grounds in support of the motion were found
to be procedurally defaulted. 10 In Virginia, to avoid default, issues must
be raised at trial, assigned as error on appeal and argued in the appellate
brief. 11
Given the state of the law, there should be a formal request for relief
from the fifty page brief limitation due to the severity of a capital murder
case and the necessity of preserving all issues for federal review. If the
request is granted, every non-frivolous claim should be at least briefly
argued in order to ensure appellate review.12 However, if this motion is
denied by the court an effort similar to that made by counsel for Mickens
to get the court to consider all arguments could preserve them for habeas
review.13
II. Vagueness in Aggravating Factors
A. Future Dangerousness
Mickens also objected to application of the "future dangerousness"
factor on grounds that this predicate is unconstitutionally vague since a
being reviewed. Issues in these categories that will not be addressed in
this summary include: (1) the constitutionality of the death penalty per
se, (2) the constitutionality of electrocution, (3) double jeopardy, (4)
additional peremptory strikes, (5) meaningful appellate review, (6)
admission of confession, (7) sufficiency of evidence of attempt, (8) the
use of photographs, and (9) sufficiency of evidence of guilt. By
continuing to utilize arguments routinely and summarily rejected by the
Supreme Court of Virginia, Mickens proved the value of preserving
issues for federal review. This is evident in the United States Supreme
Court remand of Mickens in order to allow the jury to hear parole
evidence law in light of Simmons v. South Carolina, 114 S. Ct. 2187
(1994). See case summary of Simmons, Capital Defense Digest, this
issue.
5 Mickens, 247 Va. at 401 n.4, 442 S.E.2d at 683 n.4.
6 Id.
7 Va. Sup. Ct. R. 5:26.
8 Mickens, 247 Va. at 401 n.4, 442 S.E.2d at 683 n.4.
9 247 Va. at 401 n.4, 442 S.E.2d at 683 n.4. (citing Jenkins v.
Commonwealth, 244 Va. 445, 461, 423 S.E.2d 360, 370 (1992), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 1862 (1993)).
10 Mickens, 247 Va. at 401,442 S.E.2d at 683.
11 See Powley, Perfecting the Record ofa Capital Case in Virginia,
Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 3, No. 1,p. 26 (1990); Groot, To Attain The
Ends ofJustice: Confronting Virginia's Default Rules in Capital Cases,
Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 6, No. 2, p. 44 (1994).
12 See case summary of Simmons, Capital Defense Digest, this
issue. See also Pohl & Turner, If at First You Don't Succeed: The Real
and Potential impact of Simmons v. South Carolina in Virginia, Capital
Defense Digest, this issue. Compare Breard v. Commonwealth, 248 Va.
jury is asked to find a "probability" that an accused will commit acts of
violence in the future. 14 Specifically, the defense alleged that the term
"probability" is ambiguous. 15 The court, however, rejected the claim,
observing that in a prior case it had defined "probability" as 'a reason-
able "probability," i.e., a likelihood substantially greater than a mere
possibility,' that an accused would commit violent acts in the future...
.,"16 It is, however, unlikely that Mickens' jury heard this definition.
Thus, it is strongly suggested that counsel in the future consider prepar-
ing and tendering ajury instruction incorporating the Supreme Court of
Virginia's definition of "probability." There could hardly be grounds for
refusing such an instruction.
B. Vileness
Mickens made a similar challenge to vagueness of the aggravated
battery component of Virginia's "vileness" aggravating factor. 17 The
court summarily rejected it, referring to its prior decisions. Although the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has now also rejected challenges to the
factor, 18 vileness challenges should continue in an effort to increase the
likelihood of United States Supreme Court review and clarification. 19
Il. Automatic Salvage Rule
In a somewhat confusing holding,20 the court apparently reaffirmed
its position that it is not required to conduct harmless error review, even
if one of the two aggravating factors is later found to have been applied
in an invalid or unconstitutional manner. The court based the holding on
the assumption that the absence of a formal requirement in Virginia law
that aggravating factors be weighed against mitigating factors means that
death sentences are automatically salvaged by the presence of one valid
68,445 S.E.2d 670 (1994) (defense did notpreserve the issue of thejury's
right to hear parole law, therefore, the United States Supreme Court has
no issue to review).
13 Failing to follow an impossible page limitation may be found by
federal court not to be an "adequate and independent state ground[]" for
rejecting the claim. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1976).
Though federal courts have jurisdiction, they will ordinarily refuse to
hear claims rejected by state courts on adequate and independent state
grounds, including failure to follow state procedure. Coleman v. Thomp-
son, 501 U.S. 722 (1991).
14 Mickens, 247 Va. at 402, 442 S.E.2d at 684.
15 Id. The claim is arguably meritorious. Though most people
might understand "probability" to be "more likely than not," in truth a
one in one hundred chance that an event will occur is also a probability,
and some jurors may recognize that and find "future dangerousness" on
any likelihood of violence by the defendant in the future.
16 Id. at 403,442 S.E.2d at 684. See also Smith v. Commonwealth,
219 Va. 455,248 S.E.2d 135 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 967 (1979).
17 Mickens, 247 Va. at 403, 442 S.E.2d at 684.
18 See case summary of Turner, Capital Defense Digest, this issue.
19 See Lago, Litigating the "Vileness" Factor, Capital Defense
Digest, Vol. 4, No. 1, p. 25 (1991); Falkner, The ConstitutionalDeficien-
cies of Virginia's "Vileness" Aggravating Factor, Capital Defense
Digest, Vol. 2, No. 1, p. 19 (1989); Fischer, Imposing Death Under
Virginia's StatutoryScheme, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 1, No. 2, p. 10
(1989).
20 Mickens, 247 Va. at 405,442 S.E.2d at 685 ("Mickens contends
that we have failed to adopt a 'harmless error' review procedure when a
jury finds both aggravating factors.").
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factor and no appellate court process is required.2 1 The Supreme Court
of Virginia apparently fails to see the requirement in Stringer v. Black
22
that "harmless error" analysis is required even in non-weighing states.
23
Furthermore, even though Clemons v. Mississippi2 4 held that it is
constitutionally permissible for state courts to remedy an invalid appli-
cation of an aggravating factor through the reweighing of valid aggravat-
ing and mitigating factors or "harmless error" analysis, it specifically
rejected automatic salvaging of death sentences.25 As a result, Virginia
appellate defense counsel have a dual task. The first is to convince a court
of the invalidity of an aggravating factor. Second, in cases where the jury
finds both factors, counsel should insist upon the right to a new sentenc-
ing hearing because of the Supreme Court of Virginia's position on the
issue.26
IV. Mandatory Appellate Review
There is a mandatory appellate review by the Supreme Court of
Virginia in capital cases.2 7 As a result, even though an issue is not
enumerated in an appellate brief, the appellate court is required to look
for the influence ofpassion, prejudice or any otherarbitrary factor.2 8 The
Supreme Court of Virginia, however, relied on the adversarial process
and determined that since Mickens did not object to a statement made by
the prosecution at closing, the court would not consider such a statement
as part of its mandatory review. This is an example of a failure to give
meaningful appellate review29 and arbitrary application of a state-
created right.30 Default has no place in mandatory review. Even though
21 Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 753-54 (1990).
22 112 S. Ct. 1130, 1137 (1992). See case summary of Stringer,
Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 5, No. 1, p. 11 (1992).
23 "In a nonweighing State, so long as the sentencing body finds at
least one valid aggravating factor, the fact that it also finds an invalid
aggravating factor does not infect the formal process ... [alssuming a
determination by the state appellate court that the invalid factor
would not have made a difference to the jury's determination, there
is no constitutional violation .... Stringer, 112 S. Ct. at 1137 (1992)
(emphasis added).
24 Clemons, 494 U.S. at 753-54. See case summary of Clemons,
Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 3, No. 1, p. 8 (1990).
25 Clemons, 494 U.S. at 753-54.
26 The defense did challenge both factors, specifically "vileness"
which may have constitutional merit. See Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S.
420 (1980) (plurality declared unconstitutional Georgia's codified ag-
gravating factor of vileness); Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356
(1988) (Supreme Court invalidated Oklahoma's death penalty statute
based on Godfrey); Shell v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 1 (1990) (Supreme
Court invalidated a limiting construction used by a trial court because it
was vague in itself).
this obligation of review originates from the state legislature rather than
the United States Constitution, its mandatory language affords capital
defendants federally protected liberty interests. Thus, inadequacies of
Virginia's statutorily required review should be raised in federal courts.
31
Mickens did bring to the court's attention a claim that admission of
gory photographs at the federal sentencing phase, already seen by the
jury at the guilt phase, was a factor in bringing about a death sentence
imposed under influence of passion and prejudice.32 The court rejected
the claim by reference to its earlier ruling that photographs were properly
admitted at the guilt phase to show motive, intent, method, premedita-
tion, malice and atrociousness of the crime.33 It must be noted, however,
that motive, intent, method, premeditation and malice had been proven
in the guilt phase of the trial. At that stage, the trial court also admitted
the medical examiner's testimony along with the photographs, stating
that the photographs were relevant and not repetitive.34 Thus, the jury
not only heard testimony on the condition of the victim, but also viewed
graphic illustrations. To bring the pictures forward a second time was not
only repetitive, but largely irrelevant to the sentencing phase of the trial.
Only the fifth element, atrociousness, had anything to do with sentencing
and the term has been found to be meaningless in determining a death
sentence.35 Combatting this "anything goes at penalty trial" approach is
difficult. Nevertheless every effort should be made to remind trial courts
that rules of relevance are applicable at penalty trials as well.
Summary and analysis by:
Michael H. Spencer
27 Va. Code Ann. § 17-110.1 (1990).
28 Id.
29 Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 45 (1984) (reiterating holding of
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), that some meaningful appel-
late review is required in a capital defense conviction).
30 See Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343,345-46 (1980) (holding
that because Oklahoma law afforded defendants the right to a jury
sentence, the defendant had a liberty interest).
31 See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) (recognizing
uniquepowers of the Supreme Court of Virginia to independently assess
whether death penalty is improperly imposed and noting that appellate
court with such powers must exercise them constitutionally). See also
Konrad,How toLook the Virginia GiftHorse in TheMouth:FederalDue
Process and Virginia's Arbitrary Abrogation of Capital Defendant's
State-CreatedRights, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 3, No. 2, p. 16 (1991).
32 Mickens, 247 Va. at 412,442 S.E.2d at 689.
33 Id. at 408, 442 S.E.2d at 687.
34 Id.
35 Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 364 (1988).
